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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
  
         Respondent appeals from the grant of habeas corpus 
relief to Petitioner Edward Sistrunk, a state prisoner.  
Sistrunk's petition alleges three grounds for relief.  First, he 
asserts that the prosecutor at his trial exercised peremptory 
challenges to exclude black venirepersons from the jury in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Second, he contends 
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment because his appellate counsel failed to 
press his Equal Protection claim on direct appeal.  Finally, 
Sistrunk insists that other misconduct of the prosecutor at his 
trial deprived him of his liberty without due process of law.  We 
will reverse the judgment granting relief.  
 
                                I. 
         In 1971, Sistrunk was convicted for participating in 
the robbery and arson of a furniture store, during which one 
employee was murdered and others assaulted.  On state collateral 
review, he was awarded a new trial due to ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel.  In 1981, he was tried again on the same 
charges.  During jury selection, Sistrunk's new defense counsel 
objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to 
remove black venirepersons.  The court overruled the objections 
in accordance with the then-prevailing law of Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965).  Under Swain, the defendant, in order to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was required to 
show a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in jury 
selection across multiple prosecutions, evidence that was not 
tendered by Sistrunk during his second trial.  As a result, 
petitioner, who is black, went to trial with an all-white jury.  
He was again convicted.   
         On direct appeal, the defendant's newly appointed 
appellate counsel did not pursue the jury selection, equal 
protection claim despite a request from petitioner that it be 
pursued.  In April 1985, after the appellate brief had been filed 
but before oral argument, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Batson v. Kentucky, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985).  
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court.  He then sought discretionary review by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.  While his petition for review was pending, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided Batson, holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause is violated whenever a state prosecutor 
exercises a peremptory challenge to exclude a venireperson from 
the jury because of his or her race.  See 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 
(1986).  A year after deciding Batson, but before the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had ruled on petitioner's application 
for review, the United States Supreme Court decided Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), which applied Batson retroactively 
to all cases pending on direct review at the time Batson was 
announced.  Accordingly, if petitioner's jury selection claim had 
been pressed on direct appeal, and the state supreme court had 
granted review, Batson would have been governing precedent.  
         The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review, and 
Sistrunk filed a Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) 
petition raising two issues:  whether he was entitled to direct 
relief under Batson, and whether he was denied effective 
assistance of appellate counsel when his court-appointed attorney 
failed to pursue the jury selection issue on direct appeal.  The 
PCRA court held a hearing in 1992, during which both the 
petitioner and the prosecutor testified, but not the petitioner's 
appellate counsel.  With respect to the first claim, the court 
held that petitioner was not entitled to relief under Batsonbecause the 
issue had not been urged on appeal.  The court 
nonetheless found that, even if Batson applied, the prosecutor 
had "presented credible and racially neutral reasons for each 
peremptory challenge she exercised," and that she "did not 
exercise peremptory challenges in a purposefully racially 
discriminatory manner."  Commonwealth v. Sistrunk, Feb. Term, 
1971, No. 0794-0820, slip op. at 9-10 (Pa. C.P. Sept. 13, 1993).  
With respect to the second issue, the court held that performance 
of Sistrunk's appellate counsel was not ineffective because she 
was not required to predict future developments in the law. 
         On appeal from the adverse judgment in the PCRA 
proceeding, the Superior Court held that because the adverse 
determination of the direct Batson claim by the trial court had 
not been appealed, that claim had been "previously litigated" 
within the meaning of the PCRA, and could not be a basis for 
relief in a PCRA proceeding.  See Commonwealth v. Sistrunk, 647 
A.2d 267 (Pa. Super. 1994) (table).  On the ineffective 
assistance claim, the court applied Pennsylvania's three-pronged 
ineffective assistance analysis.  The first prong is a threshold 
test requiring the court to determine if the issue underlying the 
ineffective assistance claim has arguable merit.  Only if the 
underlying claim has merit does a Pennsylvania court go on to 
assess whether counsel's performance was constitutionally 
ineffective and whether defendant was prejudiced thereby, as 
required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
See Commonwealth v. McNeil, 487 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa. 1985).  The 
Superior Court held that the underlying Batson issue was 
meritless, and counsel's performance could not, therefore, be 
deemed ineffective.  In reaching this conclusion, the Superior 
Court first found that Batson applied to petitioner's ineffective 
assistance claim, and that he had established a prima facie case 
under Batson.  The court then deferred to the PCRA trial court's 
findings that the prosecutor had advanced credible and racially 
neutral reasons for exercising each of her peremptory challenges 
and that the prosecutor did not exercise her peremptories in a 
purposefully discriminatory manner.  The Superior Court did not 
determine whether appellate counsel's conduct met professional 
standards of reasonableness.  The state Supreme Court refused to 
grant review, see Commonwealth v. Sistrunk, 655 A.2d 987 (1995), 
thus exhausting Sistrunk's state remedies. 
         Sistrunk then pursued the present federal habeas corpus 
petition.  Without holding a hearing, the magistrate judge issued 
a report and recommendation concluding that the prosecutor's use 
of peremptory challenges violated Batson and that Sistrunk's 
appellate counsel had rendered constitutionally ineffective 
assistance.  The magistrate judge acknowledged that 28 U.S.C.  
§ 2254 requires a federal habeas court to defer to state court 
findings of fact, but nonetheless held that a review of the 
record did not fairly support the state court's findings of fact 
regarding the motivation behind the state's peremptory 
challenges.  Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8), the magistrate 
judge substituted its own fact-finding for that of the PCRA 
court.  The magistrate judge did not address the prosecutorial 
misconduct claim.  The district court adopted the magistrate 
judge's report and recommendation, and ordered that petitioner be 
retried or released.  
  
                               II. 
         To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show both that: (1) counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of "reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms;" and (2) the defendant suffered prejudice as 
a result -- that is, there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 694. In 
reviewing counsel's performance, we "must be highly deferential."  
Id. at 689.  We "must judge the reasonableness of counsel's 
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as 
of the time of counsel's conduct."  Id. at 690.  Moreover, we 
"must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that 
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound 
trial strategy.'"  Id. at 689 (citation omitted). 
         In the context of this case, two additional principles 
are relevant to our inquiry into the reasonableness of counsel's  
conduct.  First, in a criminal defense, certain litigation 
decisions are considered "fundamental" and are for the client to 
make.  These include decisions on whether to plead guilty, 
whether to testify, and whether to take an appeal.  After 
consultation with the client, all other decisions fall within the 
professional responsibility of counsel.  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 
U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1433 (3d Cir. 1996).  In particular, it 
is a well established principle that counsel decides which issues 
to pursue on appeal, see Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-52, and there is 
no duty to raise every possible claim.  See id. at 751.  An 
exercise of professional judgment is required.  Appealing losing 
issues "runs the risk of burying good arguments . . . in a verbal 
mound made up of strong and weak contentions."  Id. at 753.  
Indeed, the "process of 'winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal 
and focusing on' those more likely to prevail, far from being 
evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate 
advocacy."  Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (quoting 
Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-52).  Thus, as a general matter, it is not 
inappropriate for counsel, after consultation with the client, to 
override the wishes of the client when exercising professional 
judgment regarding "non-fundamental" issues.  
         Second, in making litigation decisions, "there is no 
general duty on the part of defense counsel to anticipate changes 
in the law."  Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 
59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Morse v. Texas, 691 F.2d 770, 772 
n.2 (5th Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991); see alsoBrunson 
v. Higgins, 708 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
failure to anticipate striking down of jury selection system that 
excluded women not ineffective assistance); Honeycutt v. Mahoney, 
698 F.2d 213, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that failure to 
anticipate change in law "foreshadowed by" Supreme Court and 
federal appellate court precedent not ineffective assistance).  
"Only in a rare case" would it be ineffective assistance by a 
trial attorney not to make an objection that would be overruled 
under prevailing law.  Forte, 865 F.2d at 62.   
         In the present case, petitioner's counsel was required 
to decide what issues would be advanced on appeal when she was 
drafting petitioner's opening brief in the Superior Court.  As 
petitioner's present counsel acknowledged at oral argument, any 
issues not asserted in an appellant's opening appellate brief are 
thereafter waived under Pennsylvania law.  When she was 
preparing petitioner's opening brief, counsel had before her the 
opinion of the trial court denying Sistrunk's post-verdict 
motions and she attached that opinion to her appellate brief.  
The district court's opinion focused on ten issues, including the 
jury selection issue.  After conferring with her client, 
appellate counsel chose to appeal only the first and eighth of 
those issues in her 44-page brief.   
         Under the governing law at the time counsel filed her 
appellate brief, any effort to overturn petitioner's conviction 
on the basis of his jury selection claim would have been doomed 
to failure.  Under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), a 
defendant, to be successful on an Equal Protection claim, was 
required to prove a pattern or practice of purposeful 
discrimination across multiple cases, and petitioner does not 
suggest that the evidence necessary under Swain was available to 
him.  Moreover, when counsel was preparing her brief, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously ruled in no uncertain 
terms that a prosecutor might exercise peremptory challenges on 
the basis of race under both the federal and state constitutions.  
See Commonwealth v. Henderson, 438 A.2d 951, 953 (Pa. 1981) 
("[T]he race, creed, national origin, sex or other similar 
characteristics of a venireman may be proper considerations in 
exercising peremptory challenges. . . ."), overruled in part byBatson, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986). 
         There is thus every reason to believe that petitioner's 
appellate counsel made an informed judgment call that was 
counsel's to make.  Even if the record did not provide this 
affirmative assurance, however, we would be required to so assume 
unless the petitioner has come forward with evidence to the 
contrary sufficiently probative to overcome the "strong 
presumption" required by Strickland.  We conclude that he has 
not.  As we have indicated, petitioner failed to call his 
appellate counsel as a witness at the state PCRA evidentiary 
hearing, and there is very little other evidence tending to 
support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Accordingly, a grant of habeas relief on ineffective assistance 
grounds would be inappropriate. 
         Sistrunk's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.  
He first points to several dissents sur denial of certiorari in 
which Justice Marshall urged reconsideration of Swain, and a 
number of press reports speculating that the Court might 
reconsider and overturn that decision.  Sistrunk suggests, on the 
basis of this documentary evidence, that his counsel should have 
realized that the governing law might change and, accordingly, 
should have preserved the issue for as long as possible.  He 
stresses that he specifically asked for the issue to be 
preserved, hoping that the law would change. 
         In essence, Sistrunk's first argument is that his 
counsel could and should have anticipated a change in the law.  
While we do not dispute that there were criminal defense lawyers 
who, like petitioner's trial counsel, predicted that a case like 
Batson might be decided as it was, we decline to hold that the 
performance of petitioner's appellate counsel was 
constitutionally deficient because she did not find the 
likelihood of that eventuality sufficient to alter her appellate 
advocacy strategy.  So far as we are aware, every court that has 
addressed the issue under similar circumstances has held that the 
failure to anticipate the result in Batson did not constitute 
ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Ruff v. Armontrout, 77 F.3d 
265 (8th Cir. 1996); Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d 959 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 432 (1994); Wiley v. 
Puckett, 969 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1992); Poole v. United States, 832 
F.2d 561 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).   
         Sistrunk's second argument is based on a letter of 
appellate counsel written to him in 1987.  On February 19, 1987, 
after Batson had been decided and while Sistrunk's petition for 
review was pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, he 
wrote to counsel asking her to pursue the jury selection issue 
before the Supreme Court.  In her reply letter, dated February 
24, 1987, she told him, incorrectly, that the issue had not been 
preserved at trial.  This letter, Sistrunk argues, shows that 
counsel's failure to press the jury selection issue was 
attributable not to professional judgment, but rather to a 
misreading of the trial court record. 
         If viewed in isolation, one inference that could 
conceivably be drawn from counsel's 1987 letter is that she 
misunderstood the state of the trial court record when drafting 
her brief, and, accordingly, did not realize that the jury 
selection issue could be pursued on appeal.  Given the two year 
gap between counsel's Superior Court brief and her 1987 letter, 
however, we find the letter to be an unreliable indication of the 
state of her knowledge when she was preparing her brief.  
Considering, in addition, that counsel attached the trial court's 
opinion to her brief, and that the opinion affirmatively 
demonstrated that the issue had been properly preserved at trial, 
the inference Sistrunk would have us draw seems an unlikely one.  
Clearly, it alone is too attenuated to overcome Strickland's 
strong presumption that counsel properly exercised her 
professional judgment. 
         Finally, Sistrunk relies heavily on our decision in 
Forte, 865 F.2d at 59, to show that counsel's performance was 
constitutionally deficient.  Forte, who is white, was accused of 
rape.  At the time of jury selection in his case, certiorari had 
been granted in Batson.  He retained an attorney to consult with 
his trial counsel, and both requested trial counsel to object if 
the prosecutor used his peremptories to strike white jurors.  
Trial counsel agreed to do so, but when the prosecutor challenged 
white venirepersons, she failed to object.  She later explained 
to the retained attorney in a letter that she had not objected 
because she was "too embarrassed" to do so since she herself had 
used challenges to remove whites from the jury when the defendant 
was black.  On collateral review, Forte, like Sistrunk, pressed 
an ineffective assistance claim, and we found that he had stated 
a viable claim for relief. 
         In Forte, we recognized that counsel, when exercising 
his or her professional judgment about an objection to a 
peremptory challenge, can properly override even a reasonable 
directive of the client in the interest of "sound trial 
strategy."  865 F.2d at 63.  We held, however, that this 
proposition did not fit Forte's case.  Co-counsel and Forte had 
expressly called trial counsel's attention to the Batson issue, 
they had anticipated that the prosecution would exercise 
peremptory challenges to exclude whites, and they had reached a 
decision that it would be in Forte's best interest to raise a 
Batson type claim.  Most important, this strategy had been 
abandoned by trial counsel for a reason wholly unrelated to 
professional judgment, trial strategy, or Forte's best interest.  
Counsel abandoned the agreed upon trial strategy because of 
"personal embarrassment."  Id. at 61-62. 
         We cautioned in Forte that the case was "extraordinary 
on the facts" and that our opinion "should not be broadly read."  
Id. at 63.  It should not be read to encompass a case, like 
Sistrunk's, where the petitioner has offered no substantial 
reason to believe that the challenged decision of counsel was not 
the product of a professional judgment. 
         After a thorough review of the record and applicable 
law, we conclude that the denial of petitioner's ineffective 
assistance claim by the state court was in accord with the proper 
resolution of the claim under established federal law.  
Accordingly, it was error to grant federal habeas relief on this 
claim. 
 
                               III. 
         The district court granted relief on Sistrunk's direct 
Batson claim as well as on his ineffective assistance claim.  
Accordingly, we now turn to that claim.  We conclude that the 
district court was foreclosed from addressing Sistrunk's Batsonclaim, as 
are we. 
         In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), petitioner 
Coleman was convicted of murder and his conviction was affirmed 
by the Virginia Supreme Court.  He then filed a state post- 
conviction relief petition alleging a number of federal  
constitutional claims that he had not raised on direct appeal.  
After an evidentiary hearing and an adverse judgment on the 
merits of his federal claims, Coleman filed an untimely appeal 
that advanced these claims.  The respondent moved to dismiss the 
appeal for want of jurisdiction.  The Virginia Supreme Court 
granted the motion "[u]pon consideration of" the filed papers.  
Id. at 728.  The Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
federal courts were barred from considering the federal claims on 
their merits because Coleman had failed to show cause for and 
prejudice from the late filing and had not demonstrated that 
failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.  This conclusion followed from 
application of the adequate and independent state ground 
doctrine:  if the final state court presented with a federal 
claim refuses to decide its merits based on an established state 
rule of law independent of the federal claim and adequate to 
support the refusal, federal habeas review is foreclosed unless 
there is cause and prejudice or a showing of innocence.  Id. at 
750. 
         In Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), the Supreme 
Court pointed out that the adequate and independent state ground 
doctrine applies whenever the state court relies upon such an 
adequate and independent state ground, even when it goes on to 
address the federal claim in an alternative holding: 
              [A] state court need not fear reaching 
         the merits of a federal claim in an 
         alternative holding.  By its very definition, 
         the adequate and independent state ground 
         doctrine requires the federal court to honor 
         a state holding that is a sufficient basis 
         for the state court's judgment, even when the 
         state court also relies on federal law. 
489 U.S. at 264 n.10 (emphasis in original). 
         In this case, the last state court to have Sistrunk's 
Batson claim before it and to articulate a rationale for 
disposition was the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  It disposed of 
this claim as follows: 
         . . . Appellant contends that he was denied 
         his state and federal constitutional right of 
         equal protection under the law when the 
         prosecutor used her thirteen peremptory 
         challenges in a racially discriminatory 
         manner to exclude African-Americans from the 
         jury.  Specifically, he contends that this 
         was in violation of the United States Supreme 
         Court's mandate in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
         U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 
         (1986), and, therefore, that he should be 
         granted a new trial.  However, regardless of 
         whether Batson is applicable to this case, 
         Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he 
         is eligible for collateral relief on this 
         equal protection issue. 
 
              To be eligible for relief under the 
         PCRA, Appellant must plead and prove by a 
         preponderance of the evidence that his 
         allegation of error has not been previously 
         litigated.  See, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).  
         For the purposes of the PCRA, "an issue has 
         been previously litigated if it has been 
         raised in the trial court, the trial court 
         has ruled on the merits of the issue and the 
         petitioner did not appeal."  42  Pa.C.S.A.  
         § 9544(a)(1).  The record clearly indicates 
         that counsel for Appellant raised an 
         objection at trial that the prosecutor 
         allegedly used peremptory challenges in a 
         racially discriminatory manner, that counsel 
         raised this issue in his post-trial motions, 
         that the trial court ruled on the merits of 
         this issue and denied the post-trial motions, 
         and that Appellant did not raise this issue 
         on nunc pro tunc appeal.  Therefore, 
         Appellant's equal protection issue has been 
         previously litigated.  Accordingly, we find 
         that Appellant is not eligible for collateral 
         relief on this issue. 
Commonwealth v. Sistrunk, No. 71-02-794-820, slip. op. at 3-4. 
         Like Coleman, Sistrunk, by failing to satisfy a state 
procedural requirement, forfeited his right to secure appellate 
consideration of the merits of his federal claim in a state 
collateral relief proceeding.  The consequence in Coleman was 
that the federal courts were barred from entertaining the 
petitioner's federal claims on their merits absent a showing of 
cause and prejudice or a demonstration of innocence.  The 
consequence must be the same here. 
         The only difference we perceive between this case and 
Coleman is that the Superior Court here did address the merits of 
Sistrunk's Batson claim in the course of deciding his 
constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We 
know from Harris, however, that the doctrine applied in Colemanbars 
federal review even when the state court addresses the 
merits of the petitioner's federal claim in an alternative 
holding.  If federal review of a federal claim is foreclosed when 
the state court addresses the merits of that claim in an 
alternative holding directed to that claim, surely federal review 
must also be foreclosed when the state court addresses the merits 
of the federal claim only in the course of resolving another, 
independent claim.   
         It necessarily follows that the district court was not 
free to consider Sistrunk's Batson claim on its merits absent a 
showing of cause and prejudice or a demonstration that Sistrunk 
was innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted.   
         To show cause, a petitioner must prove "that some 
objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's 
efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule."  Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).  Counsel's error cannot 
constitute cause for procedural default unless the error was also 
constitutionally ineffective under Strickland.  Id. at 492.  
Sistrunk offers no proof of cause and prejudice other than 
counsel's failure to preserve the issue on direct appeal.  Since 
we have concluded that that performance was not ineffective, and 
since the record contains no new evidence about the events 
underlying Sistrunk's conviction, petitioner may not raise the 
direct Batson claim on federal habeas. 
                                  
                               IV. 
         The district court did not reach Sistrunk's 
prosecutorial misconduct claim that specific statements by the 
prosecution deprived him of a fair trial.  It will have an 
opportunity to address that claim on remand. 
         We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.       
     
